➊ Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary

Saturday, October 16, 2021 10:08:54 PM

Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary



The question is what kind of injury should Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary. Jimmy Chang Featured in Insider. WilliamsU. Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary the conversation You can post Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary The Mother-Daughter Book Club Analysis register later. Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary University ineligible for golf Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary. April 20, No one is forced to serve against his or her will, and those willing to serve can decide Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary military service is preferable, all things considered, to their other alternatives.

Case Brief- ESS 350 PGA Tour v Casey Martin

The question is whether, or to what extent, people are free rather than coerced. The virtue argument, by contrast, rests on a judgment that greed is a vice that the state should discourage. But who is to judge what is virtue and what is vice? In the face of these worries, many people hold that government should be neutral on matters of virtue and vice; it should not try to cultivate good attitudes or discourage bad ones. And yet we worry when judgments about virtue find their way into law. This dilemma points to one of the great questions of political philosophy: Does a just society seek to promote the virtue of its citizens?

Or should law be neutral toward competing conceptions of virtue, so that citizens can be free to choose for themselves the best way to live? According to the textbook account, this question divides ancient and modern political thought. In one important respect, the textbook is right. Aristotle teaches that justice means giving people what they deserve. And in order to determine who deserves what, we have to determine what virtues are worthy of honor and reward.

By contrast, modern political philosophers—from Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century to John Rawls in the twentieth century—argue that the principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular conception of virtue, or of the best way to live. So you might say that ancient theories of justice start with virtue, while modern theories start with freedom. And in the chapters to come, we explore the strengths and weaknesses of each. For if we turn our gaze to the arguments about justice that animate contemporary politics—not among philosophers but among ordinary men and women—we find a more complicated picture.

But underlying these arguments, and sometimes contending with them, we can often glimpse another set of convictions—about what virtues are worthy of honor and reward, and what way of life a good society should promote. Thinking about justice seems inescapably to engage us in thinking about the best way to live. What Wounds Deserve the Purple Heart? On some issues, questions of virtue and honor are too obvious to deny. Consider the recent debate over who should qualify for the Purple Heart. Since , the U. Since the beginning of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, growing numbers of veterans have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and treated for the condition. Symptoms include recurring nightmares, severe depression, and suicide.

At least three hundred thousand veterans reportedly suffer from traumatic stress or major depression. Advocates for these veterans have proposed that they, too, should qualify for the Purple Heart. Since psychological injuries can be at least as debilitating as physical ones, they argue, soldiers who suffer these wounds should receive the medal. Veterans suffering from mental disorders and psychological trauma would not be eligible, even though they qualify for government- supported medical treatment and disability payments. The Pentagon offered two reasons for its decision: traumatic stress disorders are not intentionally caused by enemy action, and they are difficult to diagnose objectively.

Taken by themselves, its reasons are unconvincing. In the Iraq War, one of the most common injuries recognized with the Purple Heart has been a punctured eardrum, caused by explosions at close range. And while traumatic disorders may be more difficult to diagnose than a broken limb, the injury they inflict can be more severe and long-lasting. As the wider debate about the Purple Heart revealed, the real issue is about the meaning of the medal and the virtues it honors. What, then, are the relevant virtues? Unlike other military medals, the Purple Heart honors sacrifice, not bravery. It requires no heroic act, only an injury inflicted by the enemy. The question is what kind of injury should count. But Tyler E.

Boudreau, a former Marine captain who favors including psychological injuries, offers a compelling analysis of the dispute. He attributes the opposition to a deep-seated attitude in the military that views post-traumatic stress as a kind of weakness. Sadly, as long as our military culture bears at least a quiet contempt for the psychological wounds of war, it is unlikely those veterans will ever see a Purple Heart. At the heart of the disagreement are rival conceptions of moral character and military valor. Those who insist that only bleeding wounds should count believe that post-traumatic stress reflects a weakness of character unworthy of honor.

And to answer that question, we have to assess competing conceptions of character and sacrifice. It might be argued that military medals are a special case, a throwback to an ancient ethic of honor and virtue. These days, most of our arguments about justice are about how to distribute the fruits of prosperity, or the burdens of hard times, and how to define the basic rights of citizens. Bailout Outrage The public furor over the financial crisis of —09 is a case in point. For years, stock prices and real estate values had climbed. The reckoning came when the housing bubble burst. Wall Street banks and financial institutions had made billions of dollars on complex investments backed by mortgages whose value now plunged.

Once proud Wall Street firms teetered on the edge of collapse. The stock market tanked, devastating not only big investors but also ordinary Americans, whose retirement accounts lost much of their value. But there seemed no alternative. The banks and financial firms had grown so vast and so entwined with every aspect of the economy that their collapse might bring down the entire financial system.

Their reckless bets enabled by inadequate government regulation had created the crisis. But here was a case where the welfare of the economy as a whole seemed to outweigh considerations of fairness. Congress reluctantly appropriated the bailout funds. Then came the bonuses. Shortly after the bailout money began to flow, news accounts revealed that some of the companies now on the public dole were awarding millions of dollars in bonuses to their executives. The most egregious case involved the American International Group A. This time, the outrage was not about ten- dollar bags of ice or overpriced motel rooms.

It was about lavish rewards subsidized with taxpayer funds to members of the division that had helped bring the global financial system to near meltdown. Something was wrong with this picture. Although the U. House of Representatives sought to claw back the payments by approving a bill that would impose a 90 percent tax on bonuses paid to employees of companies that received substantial bailout funds. At the heart of the bailout outrage was a sense of injustice. Even before the bonus issue erupted, public support for the bailout was hesitant and conflicted. Americans were torn between the need to prevent an economic meltdown that would hurt everyone and their belief that funneling massive sums to failed banks and investment companies was deeply unfair.

To avoid economic disaster, Congress and the public acceded. But morally speaking, it had felt all along like a kind of extortion. The reason may be less obvious than it seems. Consider two possible answers—one is about greed, the other about failure. One source of outrage was that the bonuses seemed to reward greed, as the tabloid headline indelicately suggested. The public found this morally unpalatable. Not only the bonuses but the bailout as a whole seemed, perversely, to reward greedy behavior rather than punish it.

The derivatives traders had landed their company, and the country, in dire financial peril—by making reckless investments in pursuit of ever-greater profits. Having pocketed the profits when times were good, they saw nothing wrong with million-dollar bonuses even after their investments had come to ruin. Greed is a vice, a bad attitude, an excessive, single-minded desire for gain. But is there any reason to assume that the recipients of bailout bonuses are any greedier now than they were a few years ago, when they were riding high and reaping even greater rewards? Wall Street traders, bankers, and hedge fund managers are a hard-charging lot.

The pursuit of financial gain is what they do for a living. Whether or not their vocation taints their character, their virtue is unlikely to rise or fall with the stock market. One obvious difference is that bailout bonuses come from the taxpayer while the bonuses paid in good times come from company earnings. If the outrage is based on the conviction that the bonuses are undeserved, however, the source of the payment is not morally decisive.

But it does provide a clue: the reason the bonuses are coming from the taxpayer is that the companies have failed. This takes us to the heart of the complaint. Americans are harder on failure than on greed. In market-driven societies, ambitious people are expected to pursue their interests vigorously, and the line between self-interest and greed often blurs.

But the line between success and failure is etched more sharply. And the idea that people deserve the rewards that success bestows is central to the American dream. Notwithstanding his passing reference to greed, President Obama understood that rewarding failure was the deeper source of dissonance and outrage. In announcing limits on executive pay at companies receiving bailout funds, Obama identified the real source of bailout outrage: This is America. And we certainly believe that success should be rewarded.

But what gets people upset—and rightfully so—are executives being rewarded for failure, especially when those rewards are subsidized by U. At the height of the bonus furor, Grassley said in an Iowa radio interview that what bothered him most was the refusal of the corporate executives to take any blame for their failures. But he did want them to accept responsibility for their failure, to show contrition, and to offer a public apology. Were the CEOs and top executives of the big banks and investment firms really to blame for the financial crisis? Testifying before congressional committees investigating the financial crisis, they insisted they had done all they could with the information available to them.

But it also raises a far-reaching question about failure, success, and justice. If the weather is to blame for the bad years, how can it be that the talent, wisdom, and hard work of bankers, traders, and Wall Street executives are responsible for the stupendous returns that occurred when the sun was shining? Confronted with public outrage over paying bonuses for failure, the CEOs argued that financial returns are not wholly their own doing, but the product of forces beyond their control. They may have a point. Surely the end of the cold war, the globalization of trade and capital markets, the rise of personal computers and the Internet, and a host of other factors help explain the success of the financial industry during its run in the s and in the early years of the twenty-first century.

In , CEOs at major U. Most of them work hard and bring talent to their work. But consider this: In , CEOs earned only 42 times what their workers did. Or do pay differentials reflect contingencies unrelated to talents and skills? Or compare the level of executive compensation in the United States with that in other countries. CEOs at top U. Or do these differences also reflect factors unrelated to the effort and talent that executives bring to their jobs? But the argument over the bonuses raises questions about who deserves what when times are good. Do the successful deserve the bounty that markets bestow upon them, or does that bounty depend on factors beyond their control?

And what are the implications for the mutual obligations of citizens—in good times and hard times? Whether the financial crisis will prompt public debate on these broader questions remains to be seen. Three Approaches to Justice To ask whether a society is just is to ask how it distributes the things we prize—income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right way; it gives each person his or her due.

Each of these ideals suggests a different way of thinking about justice. Some of our debates reflect disagreement about what it means to maximize welfare or respect freedom or cultivate virtue. Others involve disagreement about what to do when these ideals conflict. Political philosophy cannot resolve these disagreements once and for all. But it can give shape to the arguments we have, and bring moral clarity to the alternatives we confront as democratic citizens. This book explores the strengths and weaknesses of these three ways of thinking about justice. We begin with the idea of maximizing welfare. For market societies such as ours, it offers a natural starting point. Much contemporary political debate is about how to promote prosperity, or improve our standard of living, or spur economic growth.

Why do we care about these things? The most obvious answer is that we think prosperity makes us better off than we would otherwise be—as individuals and as a society. Prosperity matters, in other words, because it contributes to our welfare. To explore this idea, we turn to utilitarianism, the most influential account of how and why we should maximize welfare, or as the utilitarians put it seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Next, we take up a range of theories that connect justice to freedom. Most of these theories emphasize respect for individual rights, though they disagree among themselves about which rights are most important. The idea that justice means respecting freedom and individual rights is at least as familiar in contemporary politics as the utilitarian idea of maximizing welfare. For example, the U. Bill of Rights sets out certain liberties—including rights to freedom of speech and religious liberty—that even majorities may not violate. And around the world, the idea that justice means respecting certain universal human rights is increasingly embraced in theory, if not always in practice.

The approach to justice that begins with freedom is a capacious school. In fact, some of the most hard-fought political arguments of our time take place between two rival camps within it—the laissez- faire camp and the fairness camp. Leading the laissez-faire camp are free-market libertarians who believe that justice consists in respecting and upholding the voluntary choices made by consenting adults. The fairness camp contains theorists of a more egalitarian bent.

They argue that unfettered markets are neither just nor free. In their view, justice requires policies that remedy social and economic disadvantages and give everyone a fair chance at success. Finally, we turn to theories that see justice as bound up with virtue and the good life. In contemporary politics, virtue theories are often identified with cultural conservatives and the religious right. The idea of legislating morality is anathema to many citizens of liberal societies, as it risks lapsing into intolerance and coercion.

But the notion that a just society affirms certain virtues and conceptions of the good life has inspired political movements and arguments across the ideological spectrum. They often begin with concrete situations. Often the disagreements are among partisans or rival advocates in the public realm. Sometimes the disagreements are within us as individuals, as when we find ourselves torn or conflicted about a hard moral question. But how exactly can we reason our way from the judgments we make about concrete situations to the principles of justice we believe should apply in all situations? What, in short, does moral reasoning consist in? Up ahead you see five workers standing on the track, tools in hand. You feel desperate, because you know that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die.

Suddenly, you notice a side track, off to the right. There is a worker on that track, too, but only one. You realize that you can turn the trolley car onto the side track, killing the one worker, but sparing the five. What should you do? Now consider another version of the trolley story. This time, you are not the driver but an onlooker, standing on a bridge overlooking the track. This time, there is no side track. Down the track comes a trolley, and at the end of the track are five workers. The trolley is about to crash into the five workers.

You feel helpless to avert this disaster—until you notice, standing next to you on the bridge, a very heavy man. You could push him off the bridge, onto the track, into the path of the oncoming trolley. He would die, but the five workers would be saved. You consider jumping onto the track yourself, but realize you are too small to stop the trolley. Would pushing the heavy man onto the track be the right thing to do? It would be terribly wrong to push the man onto the track.

But this raises a moral puzzle: Why does the principle that seems right in the first case— sacrifice one life to save five—seem wrong in the second? It does seem cruel to push a man to his death, even for a good cause. But is it any less cruel to kill a man by crashing into him with a trolley car? Perhaps the reason it is wrong to push is that doing so uses the man on the bridge against his will. He was just standing there.

But the same could be said of the person working on the side track. He was just doing his job, not volunteering to sacrifice his life in the event of a runaway trolley. It might be argued that railway workers willingly incur a risk that bystanders do not. Maybe the moral difference lies not in the effect on the victims—both wind up dead—but in the intention of the person making the decision. But the same is true in the pushing case. The death of the man you push off the bridge is not essential to your purpose. All he needs to do is block the trolley; if he can do so and somehow survive, you would be delighted.

Or perhaps, on reflection, the two cases should be governed by the same principle. Both involve a deliberate choice to take the life of one innocent person in order to prevent an even greater loss of life. Perhaps your reluctance to push the man off the bridge is mere squeamishness, a hesitation you should overcome. Pushing a man to his death with your bare hands does seem more cruel than turning the steering wheel of a trolley. But doing the right thing is not always easy. We can test this idea by altering the story slightly. Suppose you, as the onlooker, could cause the large man standing next to you to fall onto the track without pushing him; imagine he is standing on a trap door that you could open by turning a steering wheel. No pushing, same result.

Would that make it the right thing to do? Or is it still morally worse than for you, as the trolley driver, to turn onto the side track? It is not easy to explain the moral difference between these cases—why turning the trolley seems right, but pushing the man off the bridge seems wrong. But notice the pressure we feel to reason our way to a convincing distinction between them—and if we cannot, to reconsider our judgment about the right thing to do in each case.

But it is also a way of sorting out our own moral convictions, of figuring out what we believe and why. Some moral dilemmas arise from conflicting moral principles. For example, one principle that comes into play in the trolley story says we should save as many lives as possible, but another says it is wrong to kill an innocent person, even for a good cause. Confronted with a situation in which saving a number of lives depends on killing an innocent person, we face a moral quandary. We must try to figure out which principle has greater weight, or is more appropriate under the circumstances. Other moral dilemmas arise because we are uncertain how events will unfold. Hypothetical examples such as the trolley story remove the uncertainty that hangs over the choices we confront in real life.

This makes such stories imperfect guides to action. But it also makes them useful devices for moral analysis. The Afghan Goatherds Consider now an actual moral dilemma, similar in some ways to the fanciful tale of the runaway trolley, but complicated by uncertainty about how things will turn out: In June , a special forces team made up of Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell and three other U. Shortly after the special forces team took up a position on a mountain ridge overlooking the village, two Afghan farmers with about a hundred bleating goats happened upon them.

With them was a boy about fourteen years old. The Afghans were unarmed. The American soldiers trained their rifles on them, motioned for them to sit on the ground, and then debated what to do about them. On the one hand, the goatherds appeared to be unarmed civilians. On the other hand, letting them go would run the risk that they would inform the Taliban of the presence of the U. The only choice was to kill them or let them go free. We have a right to do everything we can to save our own lives. The military decision is obvious. To turn them loose would be wrong. But my trouble is, I have another soul. My Christian soul. And it was crowding in on me. Something kept whispering in the back of my mind, it would be wrong to execute these unarmed men in cold blood.

He cast the deciding vote to release them. One of his three comrades had abstained. It was a vote he came to regret. About an hour and a half after they released the goatherds, the four soldiers found themselves surrounded by eighty to a hundred Taliban fighters armed with AKs and rocket-propelled grenades. The Taliban fighters also shot down a U. Luttrell, severely injured, managed to survive by falling down the mountainside and crawling seven miles to a Pashtun village, whose residents protected him from the Taliban until he was rescued. In retrospect, Luttrell condemned his own vote not to kill the goatherds.

I had actually cast a vote which I knew could sign our death warrant. The deciding vote was mine, and it will haunt me till they rest me in an East Texas grave. Would they simply go on their way, or would they alert the Taliban? But suppose Luttrell knew that freeing the goatherds would lead to a devastating battle resulting in the loss of his comrades, nineteen American deaths, injury to himself, and the failure of his mission? Would he have decided differently? For Luttrell, looking back, the answer is clear: he should have killed the goatherds.

Given the disaster that followed, it is hard to disagree. Killing the three Afghans would have saved the lives of his three comrades and the sixteen U. But which version of the trolley story does it resemble? Would killing the goatherds be more like turning the trolley or pushing the man off the bridge? The fact that Luttrell anticipated the danger and still could not bring himself to kill unarmed civilians in cold blood suggests it may be closer to the pushing case. And yet the case for killing the goatherds seems somehow stronger than the case for pushing the man off the bridge.

This may be because we suspect that—given the outcome—they were not innocent bystanders, but Taliban sympathizers. We would still need to know who his enemies were, and why he wanted to kill them. If we learned that the workers on the track were members of the French resistance and the heavy man on the bridge a Nazi who had sought to kill them by disabling the trolley, the case for pushing him to save them would become morally compelling.

It is possible, of course, that the Afghan goatherds were not Taliban sympathizers, but neutrals in the conflict, or even Taliban opponents, who were forced by the Taliban to reveal the presence of the American troops. Suppose Luttrell and his comrades knew for certain that the goatherds meant them no harm, but would be tortured by the Taliban to reveal their location. The Americans might have killed the goatherds to protect their mission and themselves.

But the decision to do so would have been more wrenching and morally more questionable than if they knew the goatherds to be pro-Taliban spies. Moral Dilemmas Few of us face choices as fateful as those that confronted the soldiers on the mountain or the witness to the runaway trolley. But wrestling with their dilemmas sheds light on the way moral argument can proceed, in our personal lives and in the public square. Life in democratic societies is rife with disagreement about right and wrong, justice and injustice. Some people favor abortion rights, and others consider abortion to be murder. Some believe fairness requires taxing the rich to help the poor, while others believe it is unfair to tax away money people have earned through their own efforts.

Some defend affirmative action in college admissions as a way of righting past wrongs, whereas others consider it an unfair form of reverse discrimination against people who deserve admission on their merits. Some people reject the torture of terror suspects as a moral abomination unworthy of a free society, while others defend it as a last resort to prevent a terrorist attack. Elections are won and lost on these disagreements. The so-called culture wars are fought over them. Given the passion and intensity with which we debate moral questions in public life, we might be tempted to think that our moral convictions are fixed once and for all, by upbringing or faith, beyond the reach of reason.

But if this were true, moral persuasion would be inconceivable, and what we take to be public debate about justice and rights would be nothing more than a volley of dogmatic assertions, an ideological food fight. At its worst, our politics comes close to this condition. But it need not be this way. Sometimes, an argument can change our minds. How, then, can we reason our way through the contested terrain of justice and injustice, equality and inequality, individual rights and the common good? This book tries to answer that question. One way to begin is to notice how moral reflection emerges naturally from an encounter with a hard moral question. Confronted with this tension, we may revise our judgment about the right thing to do, or rethink the principle we initially espoused.

As we encounter new situations, we move back and forth between our judgments and our principles, revising each in light of the other. This turning of mind, from the world of action to the realm of reasons and back again, is what moral reflection consists in. This way of conceiving moral argument, as a dialectic between our judgments about particular situations and the principles we affirm on reflection, has a long tradition. It goes back to the dialogues of Socrates and the moral philosophy of Aristotle. But notwithstanding its ancient lineage, it is open to the following challenge: If moral reflection consists in seeking a fit between the judgments we make and the principles we affirm, how can such reflection lead us to justice, or moral truth?

Even if we succeed, over a lifetime, in bringing our moral intuitions and principled commitments into alignment, what confidence can we have that the result is anything more than a self-consistent skein of prejudice? The answer is that moral reflection is not a solitary pursuit but a public endeavor. It requires an interlocutor—a friend, a neighbor, a comrade, a fellow citizen. Sometimes the interlocutor can be imagined rather than real, as when we argue with ourselves. But we cannot discover the meaning of justice or the best way to live through introspection alone. All they ever see is the play of shadows on the wall, a reflection of objects they can never apprehend. Only the philosopher, in this account, is able to ascend from the cave to the bright light of day, where he sees things as they really are.

Socrates suggests that, having glimpsed the sun, only the philosopher is fit to rule the cave dwellers, if he can somehow be coaxed back into the darkness where they live. He is right, I think, but only in part. The claims of the cave must be given their due. If moral reflection is dialectical—if it moves back and forth between the judgments we make in concrete situations and the principles that inform those judgments—it needs opinions and convictions, however partial and untutored, as ground and grist.

A philosophy untouched by the shadows on the wall can only yield a sterile utopia. When moral reflection turns political, when it asks what laws should govern our collective life, it needs some engagement with the tumult of the city, with the arguments and incidents that roil the public mind. Debates over bailouts and price gouging, income inequality and affirmative action, military service and same-sex marriage, are the stuff of political philosophy.

They prompt us to articulate and justify our moral and political convictions, not only among family and friends but also in the demanding company of our fellow citizens. More demanding still is the company of political philosophers, ancient and modern, who thought through, in sometimes radical and surprising ways, the ideas that animate civic life—justice and rights, obligation and consent, honor and virtue, morality and law.

But their order of appearance is not chronological. This book is not a history of ideas, but a journey in moral and political reflection. Its goal is not to show who influenced whom in the history of political thought, but to invite readers to subject their own views about justice to critical examination—to figure out what they think, and why. Their ship, the Mignonette, had gone down in a storm, and they had escaped to the lifeboat, with only two cans of preserved turnips and no fresh water.

He was an orphan, on his first long voyage at sea. Sadly, it was not to be. From the lifeboat, the four stranded sailors watched the horizon, hoping a ship might pass and rescue them. For the first three days, they ate small rations of turnips. On the fourth day, they caught a turtle. They subsisted on the turtle and the remaining turnips for the next few days. And then for eight days, they ate nothing.

By now Parker, the cabin boy, was lying in the corner of the lifeboat. He had drunk seawater, against the advice of the others, and become ill. He appeared to be dying. On the nineteenth day of their ordeal, Dudley, the captain, suggested drawing lots to determine who would die so that the others might live. But Brooks refused, and no lots were drawn. The next day came, and still no ship was in sight. Dudley told Brooks to avert his gaze and motioned to Stephens that Parker had to be killed. Dudley offered a prayer, told the boy his time had come, and then killed him with a penknife, stabbing him in the jugular vein. Brooks emerged from his conscientious objection to share in the gruesome bounty.

For four days, the three men fed on the body and blood of the cabin boy. And then help came. The three survivors were picked up. Upon their return to England, they were arrested and tried. Dudley and Stephens went to trial. They freely confessed that they had killed and eaten Parker. They claimed they had done so out of necessity. Suppose you were the judge. How would you rule? To simplify things, put aside the question of law and assume that you were asked to decide whether killing the cabin boy was morally permissible. The strongest argument for the defense is that, given the dire circumstances, it was necessary to kill one person in order to save three. Had no one been killed and eaten, all four would likely have died.

Parker, weakened and ill, was the logical candidate, since he would soon have died anyway. And unlike Dudley and Stephens, he had no dependents. His death deprived no one of support and left no grieving wife or children. This argument is open to at least two objections: First, it can be asked whether the benefits of killing the cabin boy, taken as a whole, really did outweigh the costs. To anyone appalled by the actions of Dudley and Stephens, the first objection will seem a tepid complaint. It accepts the utilitarian assumption that morality consists in weighing costs and benefits, and simply wants a fuller reckoning of the social consequences. If the killing of the cabin boy is worthy of moral outrage, the second objection is more to the point.

It rejects the idea that the right thing to do is simply a matter of calculating consequences—costs and benefits. It suggests that morality means something more—something to do with the proper way for human beings to treat one another. These two ways of thinking about the lifeboat case illustrate two rival approaches to justice. The first approach says the morality of an action depends solely on the consequences it brings about; the right thing to do is whatever will produce the best state of affairs, all things considered.

The second approach says that consequences are not all we should care about, morally speaking; certain duties and rights should command our respect, for reasons independent of the social consequences. In order to resolve the lifeboat case, as well as many less extreme dilemmas we commonly encounter, we need to explore some big questions of moral and political philosophy: Is morality a matter of counting lives and weighing costs and benefits, or are certain moral duties and human rights so fundamental that they rise above such calculations?

And if certain rights are fundamental in this way— be they natural, or sacred, or inalienable, or categorical—how can we identify them? And what makes them fundamental? In fact, it exerts a powerful hold on the thinking of policy-makers, economists, business executives, and ordinary citizens to this day. Bentham, an English moral philosopher and legal reformer, founded the doctrine of utilitarianism. Its main idea is simply stated and intuitively appealing: The highest principle of morality is to maximize happiness, the overall balance of pleasure over pain.

According to Bentham, the right thing to do is whatever will maximize utility. Bentham arrives at his principle by the following line of reasoning: We are all governed by the feelings of pain and pleasure. The utilitarian philosophy recognizes this fact, and makes it the basis of moral and political life. Maximizing utility is a principle not only for individuals but also for legislators. In deciding what laws or policies to enact, a government should do whatever will maximize the happiness of the community as a whole. What, after all, is a community? Citizens and legislators should therefore ask themselves this question: If we add up all of the benefits of this policy, and subtract all the costs, will it produce more happiness than the alternative?

Every moral argument, he claims, must implicitly draw on the idea of maximizing happiness. People may say they believe in certain absolute, categorical duties or rights. But they would have no basis for defending these duties or rights unless they believed that respecting them would maximize human happiness, at least in the long run. He proposed a number of projects designed to make penal policy more efficient and humane. One was the Panopticon, a prison with a central inspection tower that would enable the supervisor to observe the inmates without their seeing him.

He suggested that the Panopticon be run by a private contractor ideally himself , who would manage the prison in exchange for the profits to be made from the labor of the convicts, who would work sixteen hours per day. Recent years have seen a revival, in the United States and Britain, of the idea of outsourcing prisons to private companies. The plan, which sought to reduce the presence of beggars on the streets, offers a vivid illustration of the utilitarian logic. Bentham observed, first of all, that encountering beggars on the streets reduces the happiness of passersby, in two ways.

For tenderhearted souls, the sight of a beggar produces the pain of sympathy; for hardhearted folk, it generates the pain of disgust. Either way, encountering beggars reduces the utility of the general public. So Bentham proposed removing beggars from the streets and confining them in a workhouse. But Bentham does not neglect their utility. He acknowledges that some beggars would be happier begging than working in a poorhouse. But he notes that for every happy and prosperous beggar, there are many miserable ones. He concludes that the sum of the pains suffered by the public is greater than whatever unhappiness is felt by beggars hauled off to the workhouse.

But Bentham proposed a way to make his pauper management plan entirely self-financing. Any citizen who encountered a beggar would be empowered to apprehend him and take him to the nearest workhouse. Next to prostitutes and loose women, place the aged women. It was meant simply to promote the general welfare by solving a problem that diminished social utility. His scheme for pauper management was never adopted. But the utilitarian spirit that informed it is alive and well today. Objection 1: Individual Rights The most glaring weakness of utilitarianism, many argue, is that it fails to respect individual rights.

By caring only about the sum of satisfactions, it can run roughshod over individual people. But this means that the utilitarian logic, if consistently applied, could sanction ways of treating persons that violate what we think of as fundamental norms of decency and respect, as the following cases illustrate: Throwing Christians to lions In ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Coliseum for the amusement of the crowd. Imagine how the utilitarian calculus would go: Yes, the Christian suffers excruciating pain as the lion mauls and devours him.

But think of the collective ecstasy of the cheering spectators packing the Coliseum. If enough Romans derive enough pleasure from the violent spectacle, are there any grounds on which a utilitarian can condemn it? If these effects are bad enough, they could conceivably outweigh the pleasure the games provide, and give the utilitarian a reason to ban them. Is torture ever justified? A similar question arises in contemporary debates about whether torture is ever justified in the interrogation of suspected terrorists. Consider the ticking time bomb scenario: Imagine that you are the head of the local CIA branch.

You capture a terrorist suspect who you believe has information about a nuclear device set to go off in Manhattan later the same day. In fact, you have reason to suspect that he planted the bomb himself. Would it be right to torture him until he tells you where the bomb is and how to disarm it? The argument for doing so begins with a utilitarian calculation. Torture inflicts pain on the suspect, greatly reducing his happiness or utility. But thousands of innocent lives will be lost if the bomb explodes. This is not to say that utilitarians necessarily favor torture. Some utilitarians oppose torture on practical grounds.

They argue that it seldom works, since information extracted under duress is often unreliable. So pain is inflicted, but the community is not made any safer: there is no increase in the collective utility. Or they worry that if our country engages in torture, our soldiers will face harsher treatment if taken prisoner. This result could actually reduce the overall utility associated with our use of torture, all things considered. These practical considerations may or may not be true. As reasons to oppose torture, however, they are entirely compatible with utilitarian thinking. They do not assert that torturing a human being is intrinsically wrong, only that practicing torture will have bad effects that, taken as a whole, will do more harm than good.

Some people reject torture on principle. They believe that it violates human rights and fails to respect the intrinsic dignity of human beings. Their case against torture does not depend on utilitarian considerations. They argue that human rights and human dignity have a moral basis that lies beyond utility. Numbers do seem to make a moral difference. It is one thing to accept the possible death of three men in a lifeboat to avoid killing one innocent cabin boy in cold blood. But what if thousands of innocent lives are at stake, as in the ticking time bomb scenario?

What if hundreds of thousands of lives were at risk? The utilitarian would argue that, at a certain point, even the most ardent advocate of human rights would have a hard time insisting it is morally preferable to let vast numbers of innocent people die than to torture a single terrorist suspect who may know where the bomb is hidden. As a test of utilitarian moral reasoning, however, the ticking time bomb case is misleading. It purports to prove that numbers count, so that if enough lives are at stake, we should be willing to override our scruples about dignity and rights.

And if that is true, then morality is about calculating costs and benefits after all. But the torture scenario does not show that the prospect of saving many lives justifies inflicting severe pain on one innocent person. Recall that the person being tortured to save all those lives is a suspected terrorist, in fact the person we believe may have planted the bomb. The moral force of the case for torturing him depends heavily on the assumption that he is in some way responsible for creating the danger we now seek to avert. Or if he is not responsible for this bomb, we assume he has committed other terrible acts that make him deserving of harsh treatment.

The moral intuitions at work in the ticking time bomb case are not only about costs and benefits, but also about the non-utilitarian idea that terrorists are bad people who deserve to be punished. We can see this more clearly if we alter the scenario to remove any element of presumed guilt. Would it be morally permissible to do so? I suspect that even a hardened utilitarian would flinch at the notion. But this version of the torture scenario offers a truer test of the utilitarian principle.

It sets aside the intuition that the terrorist deserves to be punished anyhow regardless of the valuable information we hope to extract , and forces us to assess the utilitarian calculus on its own. The city of happiness The second version of the torture case the one involving the innocent daughter brings to mind a short story by Ursula K. Le Guin. It has one locked door, and no window. The child is feeble- minded, malnourished, and neglected. It lives out its days in wretched misery. They all know it is there, all the people of Omelas. They all know that it has to be there.

If the child were brought up into the sunlight out of the vile place, if it were cleaned and fed and comforted, that would be a good thing, indeed; but if it were done, in that day and hour all the prosperity and beauty and delight of Omelas would wither and be destroyed. Those are the terms. It would be wrong to violate the rights of the innocent child, even for the sake of the happiness of the multitude. Objection 2: A Common Currency of Value Utilitarianism claims to offer a science of morality, based on measuring, aggregating, and calculating happiness. It weighs preferences without judging them. This nonjudgmental spirit is the source of much of its appeal. And its promise to make moral choice a science informs much contemporary economic reasoning. But in order to aggregate preferences, it is necessary to measure them on a single scale.

But is it possible to translate all moral goods into a single currency of value without losing something in the translation? The second objection to utilitarianism doubts that it is. To explore this objection, consider the way utilitarian logic is applied in cost-benefit analysis, a form of decision-making that is widely used by governments and corporations. Cost-benefit analysis tries to bring rationality and rigor to complex social choices by translating all costs and benefits into monetary terms—and then comparing them.

The benefits of lung cancer Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does big business in the Czech Republic, where cigarette smoking remains popular and socially acceptable. Worried about the rising health care costs of smoking, the Czech government recently considered raising taxes on cigarettes. The study found that the government actually gains more money than it loses from smoking. The reason: although smokers impose higher medical costs on the budget while they are alive, they die early, and so save the government considerable sums in health care, pensions, and housing for the elderly. Viewing lung cancer deaths as a boon for the bottom line does display a callous disregard for human life.

Any morally defensible policy toward smoking would have to consider not only the fiscal effects but also the consequences for public health and human well- being. But a utilitarian would not dispute the relevance of these broader consequences—the pain and suffering, the grieving families, the loss of life. Bentham invented the concept of utility precisely to capture, on a single scale, the disparate range of things we care about, including the value of human life. For a Benthamite, the smoking study does not embarrass utilitarian principles but simply misapplies them.

This takes us back to the question of whether all values can be translated into monetary terms. Some versions of cost-benefit analysis try to do so, even to the point of placing a dollar value on human life. Exploding gas tanks During the s, the Ford Pinto was one of the best-selling subcompact cars in the United States. Unfortunately, its fuel tank was prone to explode when another car collided with it from the rear. More than five hundred people died when their Pintos burst into flames, and many more suffered severe burn injuries.

When one of the burn victims sued Ford Motor Company for the faulty design, it emerged that Ford engineers had been aware of the danger posed by the gas tank. But company executives had conducted a cost-benefit analysis and determined that the benefits of fixing it in lives saved and injuries prevented were not worth the eleven dollars per car it would have cost to equip each car with a device that would have made the gas tank safer. To calculate the benefits to be gained by a safer gas tank, Ford estimated that deaths and burn injuries would result if no changes were made.

So the company concluded that the cost of fixing the fuel tank was not worth the benefits of a safer car. Ford had not come up with that figure on its own, but had taken it from a U. In the early s, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had calculated the cost of a traffic fatality. Most people like living. What, then, would be a truer estimate of the dollar value of a human life? A discount for seniors When the U. Environmental Protection Agency tried to answer this question, it, too, prompted moral outrage, but of a different kind.

In , the EPA presented a cost-benefit analysis of new air pollution standards. The young person has longer to live, and therefore more happiness still to enjoy. Advocates for the elderly did not see it that way. Stung by the protest, the EPA quickly renounced the discount and withdrew the report. Defenders of cost-benefit analysis disagree. They argue that many social choices implicitly trade off some number of lives for other goods and conveniences. Human life has its price, they insist, whether we admit it or not. For example, the use of the automobile exacts a predictable toll in human lives—more than forty thousands deaths annually in the United States.

But that does not lead us as a society to give up cars. In fact, it does not even lead us to lower the speed limit. During an oil crisis in , the U. Congress mandated a national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour. Although the goal was to save energy, an effect of the lower speed limit was fewer traffic fatalities. In the s, Congress removed the restriction, and most states raised the speed limit to sixty-five miles per hour. Drivers saved time, but traffic deaths increased.

At the time, no one did a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the benefits of faster driving were worth the cost in lives. But some years later, two economists did the math. That was the economic gain, per fatality, of driving ten miles an hour faster. So why not be explicit about it? If trading off certain levels of safety for certain benefits and conveniences is unavoidable, they argue, we should do so with our eyes open, and should compare the costs and benefits as systematically as possible—even if that means putting a price tag on human life.

Utilitarians see our tendency to recoil at placing a monetary value on human life as an impulse we should overcome, a taboo that obstructs clear thinking and rational social choice. For critics of utilitarianism, however, our hesitation points to something of moral importance—the idea that it is not possible to measure and compare all values and goods on a single scale. Pain for pay It is not obvious how this dispute can be resolved. But some empirically minded social scientists have tried. In the s, Edward Thorndike, a social psychologist, tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes: namely, that it is possible to translate our seemingly disparate desires and aversions into a common currency of pleasure and pain.

He conducted a survey of young recipients of government relief, asking them how much they would have to be paid to suffer various experiences. So also does the life of man, though the appetites and desires are more numerous, subtle, and complicated. But here is a further case that calls the claim into question: In the s, when I was a graduate student at Oxford, there were separate colleges for men and women. These rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so I was told. Most college officials no longer saw it as their role to enforce traditional notions of sexual morality.

Pressure grew to relax these rules, which became a subject of debate at St. Some older women on the faculty were traditionalists. They opposed allowing male guests, on conventional moral grounds; it was immoral, they thought, for unmarried young women to spend the night with men. But times had changed, and the traditionalists were embarrassed to give the real grounds for their objection. Differentiated, independent advice for entrepreneurs and business owners Execution across private and public companies owned or operated by our clients Mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, capital raises Real estate advisory Sports franchise advisory. Equity Strategies We offer global, U. Fixed Income Strategies We offer a range of tax-exempt and taxable fixed income strategies, serving high-net worth and family office clients.

Our fixed income investment process employs an analysis of macro-economic conditions complemented by fundamental credit research set within a sophisticated risk management and portfolio construction framework. Meet Our Team. Our Ideas. Casey Clark, Deputy CIO and Global Head of ESG Investments, discusses how climate change is transforming economies and markets, creating long-term opportunities for companies delivering products or services that help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate.

The Cobra Effect. A dovish Fed trying to sound hawkish. Engaging Ideas: Peaking E-Commerce? Investors face a 'teflon market'. Rajiv Shah. A Conversation with Dr. Rockefeller Insights. History Rhymes. Changing the Landscape of Sustainable Investing Again. Rockefeller Asset Management has been interacting and engaging with companies to create value and catalyze positive change for 40 years. We believe that rigorous, ESG-integrated analysis, coupled with deep shareholder engagement to improve ESG performance, will yield stronger financial performance over time. Bloomberg Wealth Summit. Winning By Being Less Bad. The Countdown Has Begun? Outsized reaction to a slightly hawkish tilt.

A Conversation with Michael P. View the replay here. A Walk Down Memory Lane. Constructive Engagement Series: Becton Dickinson. We have engaged Becton Dickinson BD for nearly five years on a range of efforts to increase their sustainability disclosures and ESG performance. Know Thyself, Know Thy Opponent. Are we up for the challenge of Cold War II? In this edition of Global Foresight, we examine how fear, greed and boredom have contributed to some of the anomalies we have seen within equity markets and other asset classes.

At Rockefeller Asset Management, our sustainable investing process seeks to deliver on three strategic pillars: Research, Engagement and Thought Leadership. Explore these three pillars and how we are using each to help our clients achieve their sustainable investing objectives in our Sustainable Investing Annual Report. Responsible Investment Policy. Scanning the Horizon in a Sea of Noise. While our engagements with each company are tailored to their unique business models, this year we plan to apply a particular focus on these five areas.

The Great Transformation. Macro Themes in Focus. A Conversation with General H. Maentz Machlovitch Group joins with three industry veterans in California. A Conversation with Jonathan D. Bond's Tantrum, Fed's Conundrum. Markets bubbled up, then bond yields caught up. In this issue, we dive into the fundamental drivers behind the behavioral characteristic of private real estate and infrastructure, and why we believe such assets have the potential of generating sustainable income, providing reliable protection against rising inflation, exhibiting relatively low sensitivities to changes in real rates, and introducing diversification benefits and resilience at a time of elevated uncertainty.

Jimmy Chang Featured in Insider. ESG and Financial Performance. This new meta-study from Rockefeller Asset Management and NYU Stern Center for Sustainable Business examines the relationship between ESG activities at organizations and their financial performance in more than 1, research papers over the last five years. Jimmy Chang Featured in Financial Times. The Tinker Bell Effect. Debates over Bitcoin; signs of market excess. Cutting Edge of Innovation. The Canary in the Bitcoin Mine. In this edition of Global Foresight, we examine the current disconnect between price and value. The Roaring Twenties? Roth IRA Conversion. The Great Reset. Election not yet settled; vaccines raising hope. Bloomberg Opinion - Masters in Business.

Trending Now: Election - Jim Messina. Trending Now: Election - George H. Walker IV. Surging Waves. Broken Records. In a year of firsts, our view of the most promising and most troubling milestones. Inside Emerging Markets. Trending Now: Election - Charles Myers. State of Affairs. Emission Omission. Around the Markets: Bad Education. Jason Kelly. In Focus: All that glitters A Shot in the Arm for Value Investing. COVID vaccines could be the catalyst. Fallen Leaders. Rising public intervention; Greenback singing the blues.

Shenzhou Case Study. Around the Markets: Curb Your Enthusiasm. In Focus: Looking back to look ahead. James "Jim" McNerney. Cultural Revolutions. Hong Kong the new flash point; winds of change across America. Around the Markets: Uncertainty Creates Opportunities. Cecilia A. Discussing the Path Forward. Perspectives on Preparing for the Fall. Eye of the Storm. Amazon Case Study. Collaborating Towards Excellence. The Great Decoupling. Where Do We Go from Here? Our Chief Investment Officer, David Harris, examines the impact of the coronavirus on economies and markets, and takes a look at how they can progress from their current states. Is This Just Fantasy? The Great Lockdown. Darkest Before Dawn. Exploring the Implications of the Coronavirus in Real Time.

Fleming, on Capital Allocators with Ted Seides, where he discussed, among other things, how he led organizations, persevered and importantly what he learned during the global financial crisis. The conversation also covers the Rockefeller Capital Management business and strategy, with a focus on the structure of the business and our expertise in ESG investing. Rude Awakening.

Corporate Social Responsibility. Business and capital can work to benefit society, promote a healthy, growing economy, and be a positive influence in the world. Stealth Assassins. Augmented Reality. The Warring Twenties. Chang, CFA, highlights a few important moments for markets during the s, and discusses the potential investment drivers for the new decade.

This nonjudgmental spirit is the source of much of its appeal. Scanning Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary Horizon in a Sea of Noise. Some people think that such Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary is unjust, and Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary taxing Essay On Double Placement rich to help the poor. The right Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary said in the press conference, the little whisper to the player who needs to be brought back down Pga Tour V Martin Case Summary earth or the arm round the shoulder of the one who The Greenland Vikings Collapse a confidence boost.